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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does a parental presumption apply in a custody dispute between 
a parent and the grandparents where the grandparents were previously awarded 
custody by the final divorce decree between the parents? Custody determina-
tions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 Utah 
Ct. App. 2901f 21, 989 P.2d 491, 497. The trial court abuses its discretion if 
its decision is based on an erroneous legal conclusion. Lund v. Brown, 2000 
UT751J9, l lP.3d277,279. 
2. Did the evidence support the trial court's findings that the 
parental presumption was rebutted? Findings will not be reversed unless 
clearly erroneous. Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3. Was a parent's "fundamental liberty interest" in the custody of 
his child affected by a ruling which merely left in force a custody order to 
which the parent had stipulated? "Constitutional issues, including that of due 
process, are questions of law which we review for correctness." J.N, v. State 
(State ex rel. J.N.I 2000 UT Ct. App. 73 ^ 13, 997 P.2d 345, 348. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellees do not contend that there are any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative 
of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final order in a 
domestic relations matter. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This appeal 
arises out of two consolidated domestic relations actions. The first, Case No. 
944400298, was filed by Elizabeth Davis against Travis Davis on February 3, 
2 
1994, and sought a decree of divorce or decree of separate maintenance. (R. 
198-195.l) Travis Davis ("Father") moved to dismiss the complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction because the mother had not been a resident of the county for 
three months prior to filing the complaint. (R. 211-208.) The trial court ruled 
that the divorce claim would be dismissed, but the claim for separate 
maintenance would remain. (R. 293-292.) 
On August 10, 1994, the maternal grandparents, Sandy and George 
Thornock, intervened in the separate maintenance action, alleging that Kory 
had resided with them for nearly a year and seeking custody of Kory. (R. 291 -
288.) Mother and Father subsequently stipulated that the separate mainten-
ance suit between them could be dismissed with prejudice, but that the custody 
suit between Father and Thornocks would remain. (R. 314-313.) The trial 
court later awarded temporary custody of Kory to Thornocks. (R. 331-327.) 
Two years later, on August 28, 1996, Father filed his complaint for 
divorce against mother, Case No. 964401886. (R. 3-1.) The complaint 
alleged, in paragraph 5, that the child was in the custody of the Thornocks and 
they should be awarded custody. By stipulation, a Decree of Divorce was 
Contrary to the instruction of Utah R. App. P. 11(b)(1)(C), the papers in 
the record are organized in reverse chronological order. The result is that the 
page numbering on each document appears in reverse order. 
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entered March 4, 1997, awarding custody of Kory to the Thornocks. (R. 25-
23.) 
On October 9, 1997, Father filed a petition to modify the Decree of 
Divorce and to award him custody (R. 39-26), and also filed a motion to 
consolidate the two actions. (R. 41-40.) The trial court consolidated the 
actions. (R. 42, 55-53.) The court also ordered that custody remain with 
Thornocks during the pendency of the action. (Id.) 
The case was tried to the bench on September 29, 1999. At the 
beginning of the trial, with the concurrence of counsel, the Court spent 
significant time talking with Kory in chambers, without counsel present. (Tr. 
(R. 368) 3; R. 109-108.) The only other testimony was from Lynn Jacobson, 
who had been appointed by the court as a custody evaluator. (R. 91-90.) 
Father cross-examined Mr. Jacobson concerning his recommendation that 
custody be awarded to Thornocks (Tr. 5-62) but declined to present additional 
witnesses on the issue of custody (Tr. 67-68). The court thereafter issued its 
ruling from the bench finding the custody issues in favor of the Thornocks. 
(Tr. 68-91.) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 178-171) and a 
Final Order (R. 181-179) were entered on April 25, 2000. Father filed his 
Notice of Appeal on May 22, 2000. (R. 184.) 
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C. Statement of Facts. As explained in more detail in Point III of 
this brief, many of the assertions in Father's Statement of Facts are not 
supported by the evidence presented at the trial court. A response to the 
unsupported factual assertions made by Father is contained in that Point, rather 
than in this Statement of Facts. The only evidence presented at trial was the 
child custody evaluation prepared by Lynn Jacobson ("evaluation," copy 
attached to Father's brief), the addendum to that evaluation ("addendum," copy 
attached to Father's brief), and Father's cross-examination of Mr. Jacobson at 
trial. 
Kory Lynn Davis was born September 24, 1992, to Travis and 
Elizabeth Davis. (Evaluation 1.) At the time of Kory's birth, Mother was 
living with her parents, the Thornocks, and Father was in Spain. (Evaluation 
3.) Father returned from a tour of duty with the Navy when Kory was about 
three months old, and Mother and Father moved with Kory to California. 
(Evaluation 3.) When Kory was about 10 months old, Father left for a tour of 
duty in Guam. (Evaluation 3.) In about November, 1993, Kory began living 
with Thornocks in Utah. (Evaluation 5; see also R. 214-213.) At the time, 
Kory was just over one year old. He has resided in the Thornock home ever 
since. (Evaluation 5.) Mother and Father divorced in 1997, when Kory was 
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four, and stipulated that custody of Kory be awarded to Thornocks, subject to 
reasonable visitation to Father. (R. 25-23.) 
Father asserted that Thornocks interfered with his visitation rights. 
(Evaluation 4.) Thornocks asserted that they had not denied visitation to 
Father except when Kory was sick or when he has failed to give reasonable 
advance notice of visitation. They asserted that visitation has been difficult, 
but they have made every effort to comply with the court's order. (Evaluation 
5.) Mr. Jacobson noted the conflict (Evaluation 12, 14), and stated that it was 
his opinion that Thornocks could have made a greater effort to accommodate 
visitation by Father. (Tr. 41.) Mr. Jacobson nonetheless testified that he did 
not detect in the Thornocks any attempt to deny Kory access to his father. (Tr. 
19.) 
In addition to interviewing Father and Thornocks, Mr. Jacobson also 
interviewed five additional persons, which included Father's wife, ex-wife, 
mother, father, and step-mother. (Evaluation 2.) With the exception of 
Father's mother and his wife (the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother), 
the other collateral contacts supported leaving custody with the Thornocks. 
The paternal grandfather and step-grandmother insisted that Father continues 
to be irresponsible and immature. They told the evaluator that Father had 
abandoned his son in favor of a girlfriend overseas. (Evaluation 9.) 
6 
Father asserted that he was not able to care for Kory because of his 
military service overseas. Father told the evaluator that "he tried repeatedly 
to obtain a hardship release but was denied." (Evaluation 11.) The evaluator 
concluded, however, that "Travis could have obtained a hardship' discharge 
from the military if he had requested one." (Addendum 1.) The evaluator 
noted that "[t]here is some indication that he volunteered for overseas duty to 
continue a relationship with a girlfriend." (Evaluation 13.) He testified 
without objection that obtaining a hardship discharge would be a "relatively 
simple thing." (Tr. 40.) Father elected to not testify at trial and did not 
present any other evidence concerning this issue. (Tr. 67-68.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties and the court apparently agreed at trial that the parental 
presumption applied, but they were in error. Father had lost custody earlier 
when he stipulated that Thornocks have custody; the parental presumption 
therefore no longer applied. Because this Court will affirm on any proper 
ground, the Court should hold that the parental presumption did not apply and 
that the trial court's decision was correct because leaving custody with the 
Thornocks clearly was in the child's best interest. 
Even if the parental presumption did apply, the trial court's findings 
rebutting the presumption are not clearly erroneous. The custody evaluation 
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provided competent, admissible evidence that there was no strong mutual bond 
between Father and the child, that Father had not sacrificed his interests for 
those of his son, and that Father generally lacked the sympathy for and 
understanding of his son which was consistent with parents generally. 
Although present at trial and granted the opportunity to testify, Father elected 
to present no evidence responding to the evaluator's opinion. Evidence 
supporting the findings was also given in the trial court's in camera interview 
of the child. Because Father did not request that the interview be part of the 
record, this Court must presume the child's testimony supports the trial court's 
findings. 
Father's claim of a due process violation is raised for the first time on 
appeal, and should not be considered. There was, nonetheless, no constitu-
tional issue because the trial court did not "deprive" Father of custody. The 
trial court simply left custody as Father had initially stipulated it should be. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION DID NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THE PARENTS HAD ALREADY RELINQUISHED 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. 
The trial court held that the parental presumption applied in this case 
but it had been rebutted. Point II of this brief shows that the trial court's 
8 
findings, rebutting the parental presumption, are fully supported by the 
evidence. This Court need not, however, address the sufficiency of the 
evidence issue. Thomocks respectfully submit that the trial court was wrong 
in applying the parental presumption in the first place. It is well established 
that a trial court's decision will be affirmed on any proper ground, even if the 
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Because Thomocks (the maternal 
grandparents) had previously been granted custody by a final order which was 
not appealed, the parental presumption did not apply in this case. 
Father emphasizes that Thomocks did not appeal the trial court's 
conclusion that the parental presumption was in place and needed to be 
rebutted. (Brief of Appellant 13, 19.) Thomocks did not, however, need to 
cross appeal in order to challenge the trial court's rationale, because Thomocks 
do not seek any affirmative relief. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Construction, 
Inc., 1999 UT 69, f 7, 983 P.2d 575, 578 (appellee may attack the trial judge's 
rejection of their arguments so long as they do not seek affirmative relief); 
Halladav v. Cluff 739 P.2d 643, 645 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (If a party 
"only wants the judgment affirmed, he should not cross appeal") Thomocks 
want to have the trial court's decree affirmed in all respects. No cross appeal 
was necessary. 
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In Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized a presumption in favor of a natural parent: 
In a controversy over custody, the 
paramount consideration is the best interests of 
the child, but where one party to the controversy 
is a nonparent, there is a presumption in favor of 
the natural parent. This presumption recognizes 
the natural right and authority of the parent to the 
child's custody. It is rooted in the common 
experience of mankind, which teaches that parent 
and child normally share a strong attachment or 
bond for each other, that a natural parent will 
normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare 
for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is 
normally more sympathetic and understanding 
and better able to win the confidence and love of 
the child than anyone else. 
649 P.2d at 40 (citations, quotation marks and ellipses omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that H[t]he 
affection of a grandparent can safely be said to be no less in depth than 
parental affection." Tuckev v. Tuckey. 649 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1982). 
In Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh. 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987), the Supreme 
Court further explained: "The presumption favoring natural parents is 
analogous to the presumption favoring an existing custody arrangement. Like 
the natural-parent presumption, the existing-placement presumption is based 
on the assumption that it will normally serve the best interest of the child." 
745 P.2d at 1251. Accordingly, the parental presumption evaporates, and the 
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existing-placement presumption controls, where the parents have previously 
lost custody. L.A.W. v. State (State ex rel M.W.V 970 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah 
Ct. App. 19981 citing K.V. v. S.V. (State ex rel H.R.V\ 906 P.2d 913, 917 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Once lost, the parental presumption cannot be 
reasserted at a later date unless custody has since been restored to the parent. 
H.R.V., 906 P.2d at 917; Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
Thornocks were granted custody by a Decree of Divorce2 entered 
March 4, 1997, two and a half years before the trial in this matter. (R. 25-23.) 
At the time of that decree, Thornocks had already had physical custody of 
2Father asserts that the custody awarded to Thornocks in the Decree of 
Divorce was somehow temporary, because Thornocks were not parties to the 
divorce action at that time. (Brief of Appellant at 5.) Father does not, 
however provide any analysis of this claim, and this Court should decline to 
consider it. Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). If the 
Court were to reach the merits of the argument, the argument should be 
rejected. Although the temporary custody granted to Thornocks under the 
1994 separate maintenance action may have been the practical reason why 
Mother and Father both stipulated to leave custody with the Thornocks, it does 
not change the fact that the divorce decree awarded custody to Thornocks 
outright, with no indication that the custody was temporary or otherwise 
limited. The findings supporting the decree assert that awarding custody to 
Thornocks was in Koryfs best interest. The decree was a final order and was 
not challenged. Whatever may have been the parents' motivation, the fact 
remains that Thornocks were granted permanent custody and the parents, 
including Father, voluntarily relinquished custody. This is sufficient to 
eliminate any parental presumption. 
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Kory for approximately three and a half years, ever since Kory was about one 
year old. 
The common experience of mankind would teach that grandparents who 
had cared for a child for at least six years, since he was one year old, would 
be more likely to have a strong bond with the child, to sacrifice for the child, 
and to understand the child than would a father, however loving, who had 
voluntarily relinquished custody and who had only recently reasserted a desire 
to have custody. The sole purpose of the parental presumption is to serve the 
best interest of the child. Where, as here, the parents have voluntarily 
relinquished custody, the existing-custody presumption should prevail over 
any parental presumption. This Court should hold that the parental 
presumption did not apply in this case. 
There was no dispute in the evidence that the best interest of Kory 
would be served by maintaining the existing custody arrangement with his 
maternal grandparents. The custody evaluator, Lynn Jacobson, strongly 
recommended that Thornocks retain custody. No other evidence was 
presented at trial. This Court should hold that although the trial court erred in 
applying the parental presumption, the result reached by the court was correct 
and should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE REBUTTED THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION. 
Hutchison gave the following guidelines for rebutting the parental 
presumption: 
Consistent with its rationale, the parental 
presumption can be rebutted only by evidence 
establishing that a particular parent at a particular 
time generally lacks all three of the characteristics 
that give rise to the presumption: that no strong 
mutual bond exists, that the parent has not dem-
onstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own 
interests and welfare for the child's, and that the 
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding 
of the child that is characteristic of parents gener-
ally. 
649P.2dat41. 
In evaluating whether these factors have been satisfied, the Court must 
bear in mind that Hutchison only required proof that a particular parent 
"generally" lacks the characteristics. "Obviously, a 'general' lack is not an 
absolute lack. Thus, the standard articulated in Hutchison is somewhat 
flexible." Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Utah 1997), accord 
R.S. v. State (State ex rel J.M.V 940 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); K.V. 
v. S.V. (State ex rel H.R.V.\ 906 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Relying on In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 857 (Utah 1981), Father argues 
that the evidence rebutting the Hutchison factors must be clear and convincing. 
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Cooper v. DeLand 652 P.2d 907 (Utah 1982), however, explains that the 
Castillo clear and convincing standard only applies in termination cases. The 
Hutchison factors may be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence. 
The trial court made explicit factual findings rebutting each of the 
Hutchison factors. To challenge those findings, Father was required to "(1) 
marshal all of the evidence that supports the finding, and (2) demonstrate that, 
despite the evidence, the finding is so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of evidence and thus, clearly erroneous." JJvl, 940 P.2d at 531 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). A review of the evidence in this case 
shows that (1) Father has failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings, and (2) there is ample support in the evidence for the findings. 
A preliminary observation is that much of the evidence in this case was 
not made part of the record. With the consent of all parties, the Court spent 
a substantial amount of time interviewing Kory in chambers. The trial court 
emphasized the importance of that visit: "Those comments represent my 
evaluation of the case based upon the evidence as it has been received, based 
upon the reports that have been considered by me and read by counsel, based 
upon my consultation with counsel and most importantly, based upon my 
opportunity to talk with Cory [sic]." (Tr. 81 (underlining added).) 
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Of course, it is well established that in the absence of a complete record 
on appeal, the appellate court must presume that the omitted evidence 
supported the findings. Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Ct. App.), 
cert, denied 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Father had a right to require that the 
conference between the trial court and Kory be reported. Austad v. Austad. 
2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284, 291 (1954); Briggs v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 
282-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "Although as a matter of orderly procedure the 
court's interview with [Kory] in chambers should have been made of record, 
appellant's acquiescence in the approach employed by the trial court precludes 
him from assailing that approach on appeal." Bake v. Bake. 772 P.2d 461,465 
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A. There was no strong mutual bond. 
The trial court found: 
As to the three Hutchison factors, the Court finds 
that there is not a strong mutual bond existing 
now or in the past between the Petitioner and the 
child. This has been true for a number of years 
while Mr. Davis was away and his son has been 
in the United States. Kory loves his father and 
recognizes Travis as his father and Elizabeth as 
his mother. He sees Sandy and George Thornock 
as Grandpa and Grandma, and sometimes as Mom 
and Dad. He is only 7 but he has demonstrated 
the ability to perceive differences in relationships 
between all four people. He does not have a 
strong mutual bond with his father. A strong 
mutual bond would be necessary to take him out 
15 
of the situation he is in now. Historically, and 
presently, it does not exist. 
(R. 176.) 
This finding was supported by the report of Mr. Jacobson: "Travis has 
a strong bond with his son and Kory recognizes Travis as his father. Kory's 
parent/child bond is with the Thornocks who are the only people he has ever 
know [sic] as parents. He enjoys visiting with his father but his 'home1 is with 
the Thomocks." (Addendum 1-2.) Thus, Mr. Jacobson found a strong bond 
from father to Kory, but only recognition from Kory to father. The bonding 
was not mutual. 
It is apparent from the trial court's oral ruling that he also relied heavily 
on his interview with Kory in determining the strength of the Father/child 
bond. (Tr. 75.) 
Father complains that the findings do not specifically address each of 
the arguments Father made below. Although findings must contain necessary 
detail, "it is not necessary that a court resolve all conflicting evidentiary 
issues." Sorenson v. Beers. 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980). The findings here 
fully explain the court's reasoning. Father was gone, and Kory was raised by 
his maternal grandparents. He has understandably bonded more closely to the 
individuals who have raised him. The findings are very adequate to explain 
how the court reached its conclusion. 
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Relying on Duncan v. Howard 918 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
Father also complains that the trial court did not address the effect of the 
Thornock's claimed interference with Father's visitation rights. Duncan, 
however, only mentioned the claim of interference with visitation as one item 
of evidence which supported the trial court's finding that there was a strong 
mutual bond. Duncan does not require consideration of that factor in all cases. 
More importantly, there is no "evidence" in this case of any visitation 
interference. Mr. Jacobson noted the claims of each party, but nonetheless 
concluded that there was no strong mutual bond. Father had the opportunity 
to testify on the subject himself but elected not to. The trial court certainly 
cannot be faulted for failing to make specific findings on the impact of the 
supposed interference with visitation, when Father elected to present no 
evidence on the topic. 
B. Father did not demonstrate his willingness to sacrifice his 
interest for the child's. 
The trial court specifically found: 
The Court finds that the father has not 
demonstrated that he has a tendency to sacrifice 
his personal interest and welfare for the child's 
benefit. A total consideration of the historical 
information, as indicated in the child custody 
evaluation, and in consultation with the child has 
to be looked at to address this. The Court 
indicates that Mr. Davis did not demonstrate a 
17 
willingness to sacrifice his own interest for the 
needs of the child. Travis made little or no con-
certed effort to contest the Court's initial decision 
to award custody of Koiy to Mr. and Mrs. 
Thornock. Travis then voluntarily gave custody 
to the grandparents. 
(R. 176-175.) 
The court's finding is similar in wording to the statement of Mr. 
Jacobson in the addendum to the evaluation. Mr. Jacobson noted: "Travis 
does not appear to have been willing to sacrifice his own welfare for that of 
Kory during Kory's very early formative years. Travis was content to continue 
his military career with full knowledge that Kory was in the capable care of 
his maternal grandparents." (Addendum 2.) Mr. Jacobson also testified that 
the information available to him showed that obtaining a hardship release 
would have been relatively simple for Father. (Tr. 40.) The paternal 
grandfather stated to Mr. Jacobson that Father had "abandoned his son in favor 
of a girlfriend in Spain." (Evaluation 9 (Thornocks believe the girlfriend was 
in Guam, not Spain).) This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding. 
Again, Father complains about the trial court's failure to consider 
several of his arguments (Brief of Appellant at 26), but fails to mention that 
Father was present at trial but elected to present no evidence supporting these 
arguments. Even though the matter before the trial court was Father's petition 
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to modify the custody award, Father now argues that it was Thornocks' duty 
to present all of the evidence. Thornocks did present the custody evaluation 
and its addendum, which was considered by the court without objection from 
any party. (Tr. 62-63.) This evidence was sufficient to establish their case. 
Having established a prima facie case, Thornocks did not have the obligation 
to go further and rebut Father's anticipated arguments where Father presented 
no evidence to support those arguments. 
Father also claims on appeal that Mr. Jacobson did not have the 
requisite credentials to do a psychological analysis (Brief of Appellant at 27 
n.3), but it was Father who had suggested Mr. Jacobson as a custody evaluator. 
(R. 82-81.) There is no question that Mr. Jacobson possessed the qualifica-
tions necessary to make a custody evaluation. (Tr. 9.) The fact that he may 
not have performed all the technical tests or possessed all the degrees which 
Father, in hindsight, believed he should have might affect the weight given to 
his testimony, but not its admissibility. Father never objected to the court's 
consideration of the evaluation and cannot raise the issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
C. Father lacked sympathy for and understanding of the child that 
is characteristic of parents generally. 
The trial court found: 
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Thirdly, the Court finds that the father lacks a ten-
dency to be more sympathetic and understanding 
of the child than anyone else. Kory needs a 
relationship with his father, mother, and grand-
parents, but most of all, Kory needs to know 
where he belongs. His mental and emotional 
well-being depend on that. The father's actions 
have spoken louder than words to the child, and 
the child does not feel the father is understanding 
of his needs. The child needs time to be con-
vinced that his father loves him. The child wants 
association with the father but does not want to 
live with his father. The child needs assurance 
that when he is through visiting, he will be 
coming back home. The child does not receive 
that assurance. 
(R. 175.) 
In evaluating this finding, it is important to remember that while 
Hutchison requires that the court focus on the three central characteristics, "the 
purpose of the presumption—furthering the best interests of the child—is in no 
way advanced by requiring a formulaic statement of the trial court's conclu-
sions regarding those characteristics." Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d at 1252. The 
evidence on sympathy and understanding is similar to the evidence on 
bonding. The evaluator found that Father was bonded with the son, the but 
son was not closely bonded with Father. Similarly, it is evident that Father 
voluntarily relinquished custody of Kory when having custody did not fit with 
Father's choice of military lifestyle. Later, when Father decided that Father 
now wanted to have full-time custody of Kory, Father brought a petition to 
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modify. The focus was always on Father's circumstances and not on what 
would be best for Kory. 
The trial court also relied heavily on Kory's testimony during the 
interview in chambers: 
Cory [sic] doesn't feel that he knows his father 
very well. Cory [sic] understands that people tell 
him that his father loves him. He says his dad 
tells him that, he says Sandy tells him that, that 
his dad loves him; but right now, at seven, actions 
-as the saying-as the saying goes, have spoken 
louder than words and he needs time to be able to 
absorb and see and to be convinced that you love 
him. Saying and doing are two different things." 
(Tr. 77-78.) 
Kory's in camera testimony that he doesn't know his father nor 
recognize his father's love for him is remarkably similar to the language of 
Hutchison: "[A] natural parent is normally more sympathetic and understand-
ing and better able to win the confidence and love of the child than anyone 
else." 649 P.2d at 40 (italics added). The testimony provides ample support 
for the finding that Father lacked the necessary understanding of and sympathy 
for Kory. 
Father also challenges the perceived inconsistency between the Father's 
current improved relationship with Kory and his prior lack of a meaningful 
relationship. Whereas Hutchison requires proof that a parent lack the three 
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factors "at a particular time," Father would apparently focus only on the time 
of trial. That is not consistent with the purpose of Hutchison. Hutchison 
merely recognizes the common experience of mankind that parents generally 
care for children more than nonparents; therefore, the best interests of a child 
will generally be served by awarding custody to a parent over a nonparent. 
When that common experience of mankind does not hold true, i.e., when the 
presumption has been rebutted, the presumption vanishes and the court 
determines the best interests of the child without a presumption in favor of the 
parent. If there exists any point in a child's life when he has bonded more 
closely to his grandparents than to his parent and where the other Hutchison 
factors have been met, thereafter the only focus should be on the best interests 
of the child, rather than focusing on a rigid parental presumption which no 
longer holds true in that situation. 
POINT III 
FATHER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence in this case was the custody evaluation and its 
addendum prepared by Lynn Jacobson and Lynn Jacobson's testimony at trial. 
Father's Statement of Facts and other sections of his brief, however, make 
numerous assertions which are not supported by the evidence. For example, 
Father asserts that he became Kory's primary caretaker during the year after 
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Kory's birth. (Brief of Appellant at 6.) The cited support for this statement is 
a declaration of Father which was attached to a California divorce pleading, 
which in turn was attached to Father's answer to the complaint in the 1994 
separate maintenance suit. Although the document appears in the court file, 
it was not admitted into evidence. See Massey v. Haupt 632 P.2d 824, 826 
(Utah 1981) (admissions must be introduced into evidence before a party can 
rely on them at trial). 
On page 7 of his brief, Father asserts that he "repeatedly made 
unsuccessful applications for hardship discharge in order to care for Kory." 
The citation is to the custody evaluation's report of Father's statements to the 
evaluator. Father ignores the opposing testimony that Father chose to 
volunteer for overseas duty in order to be with his girlfriend. 
Father also asserts that "[a] significant factor in the denial of those 
applications was that Kory was not then in Father's physical custody." (Brief 
of Appellant at 7.) Although Father cites to the child custody addendum as 
support for this statement, nothing in the addendum provides support. There 
is no evidence in the record to support this statement. Similarly unsupported 
are the statements concerning Father's attempts to visit with Kory and the 
claimed interference by Thornocks. The brief contains details not found in the 
evaluation and which are not supported by the record. 
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On page 26 of his brief, Father criticizes the trial court for failing to 
give any weight to "Father's early lawsuits in both California and Utah in 
which he, an impoverished seaman, attempted to gain custody of his son." He 
further claims that the court "ignored Father's circumstances at the time with 
respect to his deployment by the U.S. Navy and the fact that Father was not 
able to take physical custody of Kory at the time in question." No testimony 
at trial, however, supported these claims. There are references to these claims 
in Mr. Jacobson's evaluation, but the evaluation also contains statements 
opposing Father's factual claims. The trial court had no obligation to consider 
the claims where Father had presented no evidence to support the claims. 
Similarly, Father claims the Court "ignored the conduct of the 
Thornocks in obstructing visitation between Father and Koiy, which led Father 
to agree to custody in order that he might obtain court-ordered visitation." 
(Brief of Appellant 26.) No evidence in the record supports this incredible 
claim that Father gave up custody just to get visitation. The record is to the 
contrary. Father's divorce complaint alleges that it would be in Kory's best 
interest for Thornocks to be awarded custody. (R. 13 If 5.) 
More examples could be given to show that Father is attempting to rely 
on statements favoring him gleaned from sources other than the trial. 
Particularly where Father voluntarily declined to provide any testimony at 
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trial, Father should not be permitted to prejudice this Court on appeal by his 
unsupported claims that Thornocks interfered with visitation. 
POINT IV 
FATHER MAY NOT RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
In Point F of his brief, Father asserts a constitutional due process claim. 
No such claim was raised below, and Father is precluded from raising it for the 
first time on appeal. Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
In any event, there is no constitutional issue here. Father voluntarily 
stipulated that Thornocks have custody of Kory. He has now apparently 
changed his mind and wants to regain custody. There is no state policy which 
is depriving a father of custody. Rather, Father already gave up custody, and 
the only issue is whether the best interests of the child are now served by 
modifying that prior decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial evidence uniformly and strongly showed that Kory's best 
interest would be served by leaving custody with Thornocks. There was no 
parental presumption because Father had previously relinquished custody. 
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Even if there was a presumption, it was rebutted, and Father presented no 
contrary evidence. The decision of the trial court, leaving Kory in the custody 
of his loving grandparents where he has been since he was one year old, 
should be affirmed. 
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